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Robert J. Burkhardt 
For some years it has not been popular to hold a 
version of the thesis that there is a necessary con-
nection between law and morality, a thesis usually 
taken to mean that one cannot refer to a social norm 
which is in some way immoral as "valid law." This, in 
any case, is what Thomistic and Neothomistic "natural 
law theorists" conceive to be the significance of law 
and morality as "necessarily connected." And this, 
given the presumptions concerning morality which are 
involved in the Thomistic position, may be what accounts 
for the current unpopularity of the position. I will 
argue that the Thomistic variation on the theme of a 
necessary connection between law and morality is indeed 
only one interpretation of the theme, for which alterna-
tive scores have been written—ones which allow a con-
siderable amount of improvisation. 
Specifically, I will address some of the implica-
tions of Ronald Dworkin's conception of a political 
morality1 which is involved in the adjudication processes 
of a legal system. Dworkin's position is, simply, that 
in arriving at their decision, judges are guided by, 
and ultimately bound to, the political-moral doctrine 
which a particular legal system embodies. This political 
morality may only be explicated, or may only come to the 
surface, in "hard cases" 2—cases where legal rules seem 
not to apply neatly, forcing a considerable degree of 
"interpretation." But the point is that that political 
morality is there all along. Dworkin's analysis not 
only criticizes and rejects both the "natural law 
theorists" and the "legal positivists" as these latter 
two schools of jurisprudence view the relation of law 
and morality, but, I will argue, provides a more 
plausible and realistic methodology for jurisprudence 
in general in the process. 
1. Traditional Natural Law Theory. Intellectual history 
has yielded numerous versions of the view on law and the 
legal processes which holds that the "essence of law" is 
incomprehensible without reference to moral standards. 
Justice is the supreme social moral standard, so law 
without justice is essentially not law. As Aquinas 
states; 
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. . . that which is not just seems to be no 
law at all. Hence the force of a law depends 
upon the extent of its justice . . . . Every 
human law has just so much the nature of law 
as it is derived from the law of nature. But 
if in any point it departs from the law of 
nature, it is no longer a law but .a perversion 
of law.3 
Aquinas' position best represents the traditional 
natural law school, though others, notably Augustine, 
and more recently D'Entreves,1* hold views on law which 
appear essentially the same as that stated above by 
Aquinas. There exists for all three, and for others as 
well, 5 an absolute canon or criterion of morality as 
this enters the social sphere; call it Reason, Justice, 
the Law of Nature. All social norms, to be called law, 
must conform to this. While social norms may have an 
effect on the behavior of individuals under that 
particular system of norms, unjust laws cannot be said 
to obligate those individuals. Instead, they merely 
coerce. 
It should not be thought that natural law theory 
represents a completely homogeneous tradition. Indeed, 
Aquinas' account and D'Entreves', for example, differ 
in the particular rules which are casuistrically derived 
from the Supreme Criterion. Aquinas and Augustine 
differ over the place of "business" in society's laws. 
D'Entreves goes so far as to disclaim the theological 
basis which traditionally had been the cornerstone of 
natural law theory, offering instead a "humanistic" 
conception with no theological implications. Philip 
Selznick6 offers a "sociologically-based" conception 
which is again different from Aquinas, Augustine and 
D'Entreves and closer to Hobbes in using social and 
historical considerations as providing the conception 
of Justice which necessarily informs law." In spite of 
the numerous variations in the details of the particular 
natural law theoretical accounts, however, the basic 
conception is the same throughout the tradition—there 
is a singular, absolute and moral criterion which is 
thought definitive of the essence of law. What is 
fundamental is that law and morality are essentially, 
definitionally connected. Indeed it is logically impos-
sible to "think them apart." 
Historically, natural law theorists have been an 
easy mark, for other than purely antireligious reasons. 
Numerous theorists including representatives from posi-
tivist, legal realist and sociological jurisprudence 
traditions in legal theory have found the tradition main-
taining a necessary connection untenable. Hans Kelsen, 
for example, suggests that 
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If it is assumed that the law i_s moral by 
nature then, presupposing an absolute moral 
value, it is meaningless to demand that law 
ought to be moral. Such a postulate is 
meaningful only . . . if the possibility of 
the existence of an immoral law is admitted, 
if, in other words, the definition of law 
does not include the element of moral 
content.7 
Unfortunately, Kelsen begs the question involved in re-
futing the natural law position. For Kelsen posits 
from the outset that what is involved in the position is 
the definition of law as moral when he already assumes 
that the word "law" can be used independently of its 
conformity with the absolute moral canon. Hence Kelsen 
already talks past the natural law theorists who will, 
it should be noted, assent to their being "law-like 
norms'1 "in nature," though these are to be distinguished 
from "legally valid norms" "of nature." So Kelsen is 
off base. 
But Alf Ross is not. Ross argues8 that the natural 
law theorists involve themselves in mistakes in episte-
mology and psychology, and exhibit practical ingenuous-
ness in holding their definitional moral canon. Natural 
law theorists presume, says Ross, that the certainly 
they feel concerning the "necessity" of law and moral 
standards being connected is the ground for truth. This 
is wishful thinking. Certainty may provide a "limiting 
case" for the truth of a claim, but does not suffice to 
establish that truth. Indeed, that Aquinas saw justice 
in law as somehow best does not establish that there 
exists no law without justice. These are psychological 
errors. 
This latter point focuses in upon the linguistic-
epistemological error in the natural law tradition. 
For, while—after Plato and (perhaps) Aristotle—it was 
fashionable to think in terms of "eternal essences", if 
the "eternal essence" of Law is discoverable, it is not 
solely by reason of intuition (again perhaps products of 
wishful thinking), but by perception. Are we to deny 
the appelation "law" to, say, a non-Christian or perhaps 
unjust social-political norm-systems? To think this is 
to make a mistake in epistemology. 
But this last mistake shows also the practical 
naivete of natural law theorists (not wishing to attribute 
insidiousness). For to deny calling a particular civil 
order a legal system, in the "real" sense, may be revolu-
tionarily or reactionarily useful for a particular group 
in a society. If those norms are not law, they are not 
anything to us. 
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Ross's criticisms do not, I believe, do severe in-
justice to the positions of the natural law theorists, 
at least not to those who maintain the necessary con-
nection between an absolute moral criterion (existing 
naturally) as definitive of the essence of law. The 
question is one of methodology, colored by a perception 
that values enter procedures for examination at any 
number of levels. For the natural law theorists begin 
by assuming that they "have" the essence of law, that it 
is moral, and that it is of a particular moral nature. 
In other words, like Kelsen who believes he can use the 
word 'law' independently of reference to morality, the 
natural law theorists believe the opposite that the 
very use of 'law' entails a particular moral essence. 
The difficulty for the natural law theorists is thus 
Kelsen*s difficulty: there is an immediate begging of 
the question, which as Ross's critique should suggest, 
must be prompted by a prior valuation of the "moral 
essence." I should like to suggest that a Wittgenstein-
ian-like directive may sidestep these problems: "Look 
and see," discover if there is in fact an "essence" of 
law, a "core meaning^ for 'law'; then a determination 
of whether that essence is a moral one, and only then 
whether the moral essence is a justifiable one may be 
in order. Though it is to immediately throw oneself into 
the realm of moral philosophizing, with all the attendant 
problems with reason and justification, it may be that 
the law is essentially moral but that no moral position 
is ever rationally justified. I should like to leave 
this issue aside. The point is that natural law theory 
rests upon an important methodological mistake, as does, 
I now will argue, the contrary position, legal positivism. 
2. The Positivist Separability Thesis. Positivist legal 
theorists, from Benthamy and Austin-iu to their successors 
Hart and Kelsen, have had the best of intentions. II. L. 
A. Hart notes that the position which was introduced (or 
more precisely popularized) in legal theory by Bentham 
to counter the ills (methodological and practical) of 
the traditional natural law doctrine was introduced 
". . .to enable men to see steadily the precise issues 
posed by the existence of morally bad laws, and to 
understand the specific character of the authority of 
the legal order."H Bentham and Austin, it should be 
noted, were first reformers--Bentham for utilitarian 
ends, Austin for Christian-utilitarian ends. In this 
regard, both wished to draw a distinction between law 
and morality for eminently practical reasons--to 
criticize the existing legal framework. And in this 
regard both recognized the reactionary use to which 
natural law theory's identification of laws and morals 
could be (and was being) put. But their objection 
rested on more methodological grounds, which Hart was 
able to frame most precisely. 
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Hart's contention is that Austin's, Bentham's, his 
own and Kelsen's view on the relation of law and 
morality is that while legal and moral norms may overlap 
in a given social system, the law must nevertheless be 
understood, explained without reference to moral con-
siderations. That is, one can and must define law 
independently of morality for any moral criticism of 
law to make sense, or, for that matter, for any legal 
criticism of law to make sense. Hart's methodological 
point is that the natural law theorists too readily 
blur the distinctions between, say, just law and de 
facto coercive powers; if a de facto coercive authority 
could be explained as a legal system, then the phrase, 
"morally bad law" has meaning. If a de facto authority 
is not a legal authority, then "morally bad law" is 
nonsense. 
Kelsen offers in this light a "pure theory of law," 
which 
. . . describes the law and attempts to eliminate 
from the object of this description everything 
which is not strictly law: its aim is to free 
the science of law from alien elements . . . 
[which] obscure(s) the essence of the science of 
law and obliterates the limits imposed upon it 
by the nature of its subject matter. 1 2 
The quest is then for a positivist science, an analysis 
and description of the legal system which is, presumably 
unlike the analyses offered by the natural law theorists, 
"value free." 
But far from the methodological-scientific point, 
Kelsen and Hart proceed actually to undertake the non-
moral analysis of law. Hart suggests that "the law" is 
essentially only a "union of primary and secondary 
rules." 1 3 Neither the primary (obligation) rules nor 
the secondary (procedural) rules need embody moral con-
tent, or need reflect a certain criterion of Justice, 
Reason or Good. Similarly, Kelsen suggests that 
". . . the difference between law and morals can be 
found . . . in how they command or prohibit certain 
behavior . . . ; law is a coercive order . . - ; whereas 
morals is a social order without such sanctions."111 The 
nonmoral analysis of the legal system thus yields 
descriptions of law which are not only themselves devoid 
of any evaluations, positive or negative, of the object 
of the enquiry, but which also show "the law" as 
essentially devoid of moral evaluations. Law is law; 
and morals are morals. 
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In practice, both Kelsen and Hart admit of morality 
in law. Hart notes at length that not only is it true 
that in the United States and in England are moral 
principles, like principles of justice, incorporated 
into the basic structure of the legal institutions, 
The further ways in which law mirrors 
morality are myriad, and still insufficiently 
studied: statutes may be a mere legal shell 
and demand by their express terms to be 
filled out with the aid of moral principles; 
the range of enforceable contracts may be 
limited by reference to conceptions of 
morality and fairness; liability for both 
civil and criminal wrongs may be adjusted 
to prevailing views of moral responsibility. 
No •positivist' could deny that these are 
facts, or that the stability of the legal 
system depends in part on such types of 
correspondence with morals. If this is what 
is meant by the necessary connection of law 
and morals, its existence should be con-
ceded. 15 
Hart's admission that in fact law and morality are not 
"necessarily unconnected" goes a long way toward 
strengthening the position of the legal positivists in 
the face of criticisms to the effect that positivism is 
an "abstracted, merely formalistic" way of looking at 
law.Iß But Hart's admission also forces an evaluation 
of precisely what the positivists are saying. For 
Kelsen makes the point that 
. : . if, presupposing only relative moral 
values, the demand is made to separate law 
and morals in general, and law and justice 
in particular, then this demand does not 
mean that law and morals, law and justice 
are unrelated; it does not mean that the 
concept of law is outside the concept of 
the Good. 1 7 
This raises the question, what if only relative moral 
values are presupposed? That is, could it be that the 
natural theorists are wrong, not about law, but about 
morality? 
With the exception of Hart, who is a utilitarian 
of sorts,18 it is safe to say that contemporary legal 
positivists are moral noncognitivists. Their position 
vis-a-vis the place of morals in law denies any 
singular, absolute canon of morality as definitive of, 
or even explicative of, the "essence of law," because, 
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simply, there is no such canon of morality. Indeed, all 
moral judgements or moral criteria are only "ejaculations" 
or personal preference-statements. Hart's position is a 
bit more complex, implying as he does that there may be 
a way to arrive at a "greatest welfare principle." Still, 
Hart sides with the positivist-emotivists in believing 
that there is no singular moral criterion which is 
definitive of the essence of law. But that no particular 
moral criterion is definitive of law does not mean that 
(as Kelsen seems to suggest) not any moral criterion is 
definitive of law.. Indeed, morality may necessarily 
enter law, though not the theistically grounded morality 
of Augustine and Aquinas, nor the rationally intuited 
morality of D'Entreves, nor the sociologically-derived 
morality of Selznick. 
The positivist position can be objected to on two 
levels. First, an objection similar to that raised 
against the natural law theorists can be offered: in 
denying the connection between the definition of law 
and that of morality, the positivists may be begging 
important questions concerning the nature of definition. 
If there is a connection between law and morality in 
every legal system which could exist, then to say that 
there is no logical connection between law and morality 
is to posit a "disembodied essence" for law. Positing 
an essence may not, as such, be mistaken, if that is 
conceived as a "modeling" activity, akin to the utiliza-
tion of geometric representations of "pure competition" 
in economic theory. But the dangers involved in this 
modeling activity are similar to those pointed out by 
Ross concerning natural law theory—psychological, and 
epistemological errors ultimately giving rise to practi-
cal dangers. Hart's "model of rules" and Kelsen's 
"pure theory," in modeling law without reference to 
moral norms, falls into this danger, of serving to pro-
mote a nonevaluation of the results of the "value free" 
science. 
On a second level, perhaps more substantive criti-
cisms can be offered. For both Hart and Kelsen, while 
recognizing the coercive effect of social norms (which 
they claim as the essence of law) fail to see those 
coercive norms as operative in a political-moral order. 
That is, while Kelsen, for instance, wishes to deny that 
political ideology or moral judgement enters legal 
theory, what he produces is a theory which does not 
explain how political ideology and moral judgement enter 
law itself. The methodological mistakes succeed in 
generating descriptive ingenuousness. Similarly, Hart, 
recognizing "overlap" of law, morals, and politics, 
cannot concede that there is more at work in the law 
than just that overlap. Indeed, the overlap is essential 
to defining and explaining law. 
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These criticisms suggest that as regards the rela-
tion of law and morality, positivism as a legal theory 
suffers, as does natural law theory, from telling only 
half the story. On the one hand, natural law theory 
cannot describe law without reference to the absolute 
moral standard of Justice, Reason or Good. On the other 
hand, legal positivism cannot describe or define law 
with reference to the moral standards operative in a 
society. I wish to argue at this point that Dworkin's 
analysis of "political morality in law" is a more 
adequate representation of the "essence of law," for 
its avoidance of the pitfalls which Ross, for one, has 
pointed out as "there to be avoided" in legal theory. 
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3. Dworkin1s Non-separability Thesis. On the surface, 
Ronald Dworkin's argument is directed against Hart's 
"model of rules" mentioned above. But interestingly 
Dworkin's thesis is, at least concerning law and morality, 
not one which Hart, in his less "positivistic" moments, 
may wish to deny. Dworkin argues that (1) contra Hart 
and Kelsen, judges do not have "discretion in the strong 
sense" to make law where the specifically legal rules do 
not apply neatly; (2) judges are rather bound to inter-
pret statutes in the light of a political morality which 
the legal system embodies; (3) such interpretations are 
"internal to law," and create legally obligating prece-
dent; and (4) in spite of the fact that political 
morality as such is in law, we still need to evaluate, 
morally, that "positive morality." On close inspection, 
Hart for one may agree with (3) and (M). This possible 
point of agreement is where I will focus my attentions. 
(1) Dworkin's argument that judges do not have 
"discretion in the strong sense"2'-' rests with two claims, 
one linguistic, the other behavioral. For one, Hart 
had argued that the "nature of rules" dictates that 
interpretations will often be arbitrary, since first, 
rules are general and do not "pick out instances of 
themselves," and secondly, instances are particular and 
individualized, and do not "pick out rules for them-
selves. "21 So "fitting a rule and instance" is a matter 
of judgement, the arbitrariness of which is determined 
by the vagueness and generality of the rule. This 
"fact" of arbitrariness suggests a considerable degree of 
"judicial discretion." Dworkin claims, however, that 
laws are formulated not only as rules, but also as 
principles and policies, the former dictating "ways of 
treatment" of cases, the latter dictating consequences 
to be achieved by a decision. So while rules may allow 
discretion, the principles and policies of law narrow 
the range of this discretion to certain "ways of treat-
ment" and consequences to be achieved." Not all 
(written) laws are rules, so rule interpretation is not 
all there is. This is just a fact about the "language 
of law." 
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But this also shows in the behavior of judges. 
Hart seems to assume that judges allow themselves a con-
siderable degree of discretion, in that they are forced 
to create law in certain cases by the absence of de-
terminate rules. Dworkin counters this, however, in 
suggesting that judges will find a principle or policy 
in law to justify their decision as a legal, "valid," 
pronouncement. Granted, no one can say that the reason 
why the judge "found" that principle was the principle 
itself. But it is the principle (or policy) , and not 
the judge's "reason for holding it" which counts as law. 
Dworkin suggests that "discretion in the strong sense" 
does not exist. 
(2) If judges must interpret law in light of rules, 
principles and policies for their holding to be real 
law, then judges as judges are bound, obligated by, 
these principles, rules, and policies in lav-;. Hart had 
maintained that precedent, for instance, was too weak 
and ambiguous to obligate judges legally. 2 2 ßtlt as 
Dworkin sees it, this is to fall back on the rule analy-
sis. The principles and policies (more the former than 
the latter) of law may be vague, but not ambiguous. 
And, in fact, the body of "common law," the decisions of 
judges embodied in precedent, forms a more or less co-
herent set of doctrine concerning rights, personality, 
liability, and the moral and political worth of individ-
ual action. Besides the fact that judges are for the 
most part "political creatures," aware of the sources 
of and beneficiaries of their exercise of authority, 
they are also "roles"—with definite professional 
responsibilities attached. Part of these responsibili-
ties is the requirement that they "understand" the 
political and moral traditions of their office, in-
cluding the traditionally developed common law doctrine 
having moral and political content. So, by yirtue of 
their legal position judges are legally bound (though 
perhaps no determinate rule gives this obligation) to 
follow political, moral, and legal precedent. Dworkin 
calls this the "doctrine of political responsibility."23 
Again, the point is that discretion is significantly 
weaker than the positivists allow. 
(3) Part of the positivist program was the desire, 
articulated above by Kelsen, to free law and legal 
theory of "alien elements." In Kelsen's work this 
amounted to modeling law after scientific theory (from 
the positivist perspective), complete with "pyramidal 
structure."21' In Hart's work, this amounts to dis-
tinguishing an "internal point of view" on law which 
"sees the obligatoriness" of certain behaviors from an 
"external point of view" 2 5 which sees only patterns or 
regularities of conduct. Hart's approach follows the 
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post-Wittgensteinian tradition in social science" of 
maintaining that certain "criteria of identity" are 
visible only after certain "basic reasons"—intrasystemic 
rationales—are accepted by the observer. From the 
position of maintaining some things as external to law, 
both Kelsen and Hart reiterate their arguments that since 
judges use non-rule guidelines in formulating their 
decisions, the judicial decision marks a "limit of law," 
a "gap in the law." 2 7 
Dworkin counters by rejecting first the pyramidal 
view of the legal system. Especially in those nations 
which have constitutional "separation of powers" and 
even in those legal systems which do not, there is no 
neat system of internal relations proceeding from the 
top down, nor from the bottom up. "Legality" is spread 
across the entire legal system. And Dworkin further re-
jects the idea that the "internal criteria of law" can 
ever be precisely formulated, so that a singular line 
of demarcation can be drawn to differentiate "this as 
law" from "this as not law." The argument to the effect 
that political and moral doctrine are in precedent, 
which is legally binding on judges, is offered in sup-
port of this. 
If there is an "internal point of view," however, 
it must be understood as the basic legitimation pro-
cesses of the whole legal-political-moral order. We 
may wish to say that, say, from a liberal western 
democratic position, South African "legal practice" 
does not appear as law. Or, we may wish to say that a 
certain renegade (or perhaps senile) judge's behavior 
is "marginal" to law. These amount to taking certain 
"criteria of identity," though now moral-political, as 
well as "formally legal" canons as operative in the 
acceptance of the "internal point of view." 
These considerations lead directly into the next 
point, the need for an evaluation of the political-moral 
criteria which are embodied in law through both the 
judicial decision as well as the legislative enactment. 
But the final point to be made with regard to the 
"internality" of these criteria is that, simply, what 
else could it be? A logical, or an empirical investiga-
tion of social norms may be able to isolate specifically 
legal norms, say, a 55 mile per hour speed limit; or 
such an investigation may be able to isolate a specif-
ically moral norm, say, a Southern Baptist prohibition 
against partaking of alcoholic spirits. But when one 
looks at the activities involved in "the law" one must 
see that the distinctions between law and morality 
become blurred. As Dworkin suggests, this blurring is 
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only most visible in the judicial decision colored by 
interacting moral, political, economic and personal 
standards. Still, it exists in all aspects of social 
life. Many "criteria of identity" are operative, 
internally to law. 
(•») In the Hart-Devlin debates 2 8 of the last decade, 
Hart took up the position articulated by Austin concern-
ing the place of "positive morality" in law. The idea 
was that a certain political morality does in fact exist-
in law, which perhaps reflects the "community standards" 
against, say, homosexual activity. That this positive, 
politically operative moral code may be mistaken is, 
however, always a danger. Indeed Austin thought that 
only if this positive morality were evaluated vis-a-vis 
"God's law" could it be justified. And similarly Hart-
thought that not only were certain incoherencies attached 
to the idea of a community moral code, but that this 
must be critically evaluated as well. 
Dworkin's final point against the positivists 
(though here again Hart may be forced to agree) is that 
the positive, political morality which is embodied in 
the common law must be criteally justified. Where 
Dworkin differs with Hart is in the description of what 
must be justified. For Hart thought it only contingent 
to the definition of law that this positive moral code 
be included in his description. Dworkin thinks it 
essential to understanding what law is, and what law 
does, that the political morality be fully understood. 
For the political and moral doctrine embodied in the 
common law conditions the canons of legality, and indeed 
dictates how certain community moral judgements may 
enter the legal process. If, for instance, the opera-
tive traditional political morality "takes rights 
seriously," to borrow Dworkin's phrase, while the com-
munity standards take a turn to the right in negatively 
evaluating homosexual human beings' freedoms, problems 
arise in the justification of the (rights-protecting) 
judicial judgement. We are forced to look very hard, 
and very critically, at both the community evaluation 
as well as the traditional political-moral doctrine. 
One may have to give. 
For the validity (the internal criterion of legal 
adequacy) of the law may rest with the critical evalua-
tion of community moral standards (perhaps reflected in 
legislative enactments)29 a n d traditional common law doctrine (perhaps reflected in supreme or even lesser 
court decisions). That Dworkin sides in general with 
the court decision respecting rights above all matters 
of democratically enacted moral judgements is not at 
issue here. The importance of his analysis rests with 
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the identification of how morality necessarily enters 
our description of law. Armed with this more realistic 
perception, men may perhaps be better able to "see 
steadily the precise issues posed by the existence of 
morally bad laws." 
4. Concluding Note: Politics and the Internal Morality 
of Law. To a large extent, Dworkin's position resembles 
that of Lon Fuller, whose argument for a certain "inter-
nal morality of law"30 prompted numerous criticisms from 
the positivist camp. Fuller argued that certain condi-
tions, for example, generality, non-retroactivity, non-
contradictoriness, constancy through time, congruence 
between law and official action, were necessary, in the 
definitional and descriptive sense we have been discus-
sing, for law per se to exist. Fuller was justly 
criticized3! for ideologically "building in" too much 
in the way of liberal democratic political doctrine into 
his specifically legal theory even though Fuller thought 
himself describing "the law" in much the same way as 
the positivists had done. To say, for instance, that 
"the law" must not be retroactive may either be to place 
a democratic-moral condition on the law, or to pass into 
a purely "functional" description of law which pre-
supposes a positivistic account in the first place. 
Fuller's conditions are either "truisms," similar to 
Hart's "minimal natural law"32 conditions, or he has 
not gone far enough. 
With Dworkin's account of the necessity of political 
moral considerations entering law, however, we can begin 
to salvage Fuller's conditions. For Fuller's canons may 
indeed be descriptive of the law per se from within a 
particular political-moral common law tradition. And 
Since Fuller's conditions appear to represent just those 
criteria operative in a liberal western constitutional 
democracy like the United States or West Germany, the 
canons may not be absolute. But then again, they may be. 
In line with Dworkin, they very well may be--but only if 
we can arrive at a reasoned critical justification of 
the political-moral doctrine which they embody. 
Ultimately, the test of a legal theory is how it 
proceeds when we "get down to cases." Very recently, 3 3 
a number of critics have done just this with regard to 
Dworkin's thesis concerning political morality entering 
law through the judicial decision. The results of this 
new "twist" in the dialogue (or more precisely "tri-
alogue") between Dworkin, positivism and natural law 
theorists remains to be seen. My intuition is that 
Dworkin will "win." 
For a second ultimate test of a legal theory is how 
well it coheres with our "considered judgements" about 
what actually goes on in the legal system. The law, to 
my eyes, is only a part of an ongoing process of social 
control, social integration, interpersonal exchanges. 
The whole process, involving as it does perhaps an over-
abundance of interacting and conflicting moral, politi-
cal, economic, personal, and so on, evaluations, perhaps 
may never be completely understood. It does no good, 
however, to formulate models, the "fit" of which to the 
actual process is at best strained, at worst wrong-
headed. Though Dworkin's thesis allows considerable 
"play," I suggest that it is to the point—that point 
where law and morality necessarily relate. 
Florida State University 
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